Showing posts with label Theory of Knowledge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Theory of Knowledge. Show all posts

Saturday, 29 December 2018

Word of the Week: Foundationalism


Meet Susan Haack - a new foundationalist.

Are there secure foundations to knowledge? 'Foundationalism' is a theory of knowledge, or how we justify our beliefs. Foundationalists think all beliefs ultimately get their justification from a set of very basic beliefs or sensory states which are the 'foundations' of knowledge. Otherwise, there'd be no foundation, and to fully justify any claim we'd have to say 'A is the case, because B, because C, because D', and so on until infinity! Foundationalists think infinite justification is absurd, so they prefer to base knowledge claims upon a secure foundation - a bit like building a house on rock, not on sand...

So there ought to be secure foundations for knowledge. But it is difficult to see what these foundations really are. The general form of foundationalism seems to be acceptable, but it is difficult to point to the content of any particular theory. There are secure foundations out there, but we don't really know what they are! Perhaps a moderate solution is needed: we might admit that Susan Haack is right in embracing 'foundherentism', which combines the 'foundationalist' insight with the 'coherentist' view that beliefs can justify each other without resting solely on a bedrock of 'basic' beliefs which don't need further justification. Foundationalists think knowledge is like a pyramid. Coherentists think it's like a web: not only does basic belief B justify derivative belief D, but D also can justify B and vice versa - within webs of reinforcing beliefs. Perhaps by 'secure' foundations we don't mean an indubitable foundation but some kind of sound basis for knowledge which can be strengthened by coherence relations and, perhaps, reliable processes too. Contrary to Descartes' assertion that we can all be dead certain of certain beliefs - e.g., 'I exist' and 'God exists' - maybe knowledge has somewhat weaker, but still significant, foundations. The alternative is the scepticism which results from rejecting basic beliefs.

To start with, let's consider epistemic foundationalism - the view that there must be some foundations to knowledge, whatever they are. I embrace epistemic foundationalism because the alternatives are pretty bad. The argument for epistemic foundationalism is the so-called 'regress argument'. Richard Fumerton uses the Principle of Inferential Justification, which states that: S's belief that P on basis E is justified if (1) S's belief that E is justified and (2) S's belief that E makes probable P is itself justified. Let's take (1) first, and return to (2) later. 

For S's belief that E to be justified, S must belief some other proposition - E1, say - which must also be justified. And so on. So we can see that part (1) of Fumerton's simple principle leads us to regress: the justified belief that E1 depends on another proposition E2, then another proposition E3, and so on until infinity. According to the regress argument for the view that knowledge has foundations, a contradiction is generated. On the one hand, regress leads us into there being an infinity of prior justifications for any given belief. On the other hand, it seems implausible that there can exist such an infinite regress! How can finite minds ever comprehend infinite chains of reasons? What's more, if the infinite chain were completed, it would no longer be infinite! The obvious way of resolving this dilemma is by embracing the claim that some knowledge is non-inferential - i.e., not inferred from any other belief. This non-inferential knowledge is therefore foundational. It either justifies itself or doesn't need justification: these are the foundations you're looking for! We don't know exactly what they are, mind you. All that Fumerton's argument proves is that there must be foundations of some kind - otherwise knowledge as we understand it is impossible.

But infinitists such as Peter Klein think infinite regress is perfectly reasonable: we can have infinite chains of justification that enable us to really have 'knowledge'. He rejects one alternative - 'coherentism' - on the grounds that it leads to circularity. Coherentists say that S's belief that P is justified if S's whole system of beliefs is justified by the coherence of the relations between the beliefs in that system - like a spider's web. But this suggests that it's possible for P to justify itself - albeit indirectly - by a chain of reasons which loops back on P. But Klein thinks we should all accept the Principle of Avoiding Circularity: circular reasoning is unreasonable. So we should reject pure coherentism. (I'll return to Haack's modified version - 'foundherentism' - later.) Also, Klein rejects foundationalism, because he thinks we should all accept the Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness, which stops knowledge from having arbitrary foundations that have no justification. In Klein's view, to argue for the view that knowledge has secure foundations is like arguing for the view that one can simply believe something without having any good reason for believing it - so one foundationalist cannot challenge another if their arbitrary foundations differ! For instance, foundationalist Bertrand Russell thinks sense data - or sensory states, like a perception of a chair - are basic reasons for believing propositions such as 'There's a chair over there!'. But religious foundationalists like Alvin Plantinga think that a religious believer's belief is God is foundational, or basic. But both these foundations might be arbitrary - after all, a religious believer's so-called 'basic' belief that God exists is not likely to convince an atheist who has different 'foundations' to their knowledge. So if you want to avoid arbitrariness and circularity, Klein wants you to embrace infinitism!

Infinitism, however, isn't really that convincing. Look back at condition (2) of Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification: S's first belief that P on basis E is justified IF S's further belief, 'E makes probable P', is itself justified. Like (1), this leads to regress. If one's belief that it will rain tomorrow (P) is justified by your belief that the Met Office said so (E) and your further belief that what the Met Office says is reliable (i.e., E makes probable P), one would also need a reason for thinking that reliability itself is a good reason for believing reports!  You would need the further belief, which also requires justification, such as 'The Met Office's reliability is a justification for my believing its predictions'. But what is this the case? And so on, and so on. So (1) leads to regress, (2) leads to regress, and (2) also leads to an infinite number of infinitely long chains of reasons! Even if infinitism is not incoherent, it's surely absurd. As Carl Ginet points out, '[i]nference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it' from one belief to the next. And as Jonathan Dancy argues, '[j]ustification by inference is conditional justification only'. To argue on the basis of inference from one belief to another presupposes that the inferential relation itself is justified - which at some point must require some kind of foundation, such as the basic belief that the inductive principle (inferring generalisations from observations) is valid. If one doesn't have any foundations, one doesn't have justification - infinitism cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it. 

So what are the foundations? Laurence BonJour thinks logical beliefs like 'anything deduced from a true proposition is true' (Bertrand Russell's example) are foundational. They are the basis for inference. This seems reasonable - without certain basic logical beliefs, in maths or in scientific principles, we can't really go about making justifiable inferences about, well, anything. But what makes these beliefs justified? Well, if they're basic, they don't require further justification! But perhaps what we mean is not 'they don't require further justification at all', but 'they don't require further justification of the usual kind'. They require special justification, which might still allow them to be foundational - or not requiring normal justification. They might be arrived at by reliable processes. As Carruthers (1992) argues, the means by which 'one's belief comes to be innate is reliable' - or generated by a process which tends to generate true beliefs. Our cognitive processes must be reliable for epistemic foundations to be secure. So it seems even self-evidence principles like 'The rules of addition are valid' need to be based on reliable cognitive processes. They are still strictly foundational, but they're not as secure as we once thought. Their security depends on processes outside of them. Beliefs derive their full warrant from external (cognitive) processes, not just internal justifications. Underneath the superficial security of foundational beliefs lie important reliable processes. 

Another possible foundation is sense-data: e.g., the sense-datum of a table. We base our knowledge on such sense-data, which don't need justifying. They're just experiences which form the basis of our justified beliefs. But as BonJour notes, this kind of foundationalism is problematic. Either sense-data assert that something exists or they don't. If they don't, then how could they justify beliefs which do make such assertions? On the other hand, if a sense-datum of a table can assert that the table exists, then what makes this assertion justified? The assertive representational content itself - not the sense-data - is doing the justification! Sense-data can't justify beliefs, because either they don't have the necessary conceptual content to do so, or they implicitly contain beliefs about existence which are the real sources of justification. These implicit beliefs (e.g., the belief that 'There's a table there' whenever we see, or have a sense-datum of, a table) surely need further justification. But this justification needs yet another justification, and so on, until we get to something basic. The alternative is infinite regress. What's certain is that sense data are not the secure foundations we're looking for.

Susan Haack wants us to embrace a synthesis. Foundations can't be indubitable - or beyond doubt. But they can be secure enough to provide reasons for believing non-basic beliefs. We may not have indubitable knowledge in sense-datum-like 'S-states'. But we can have some kind of knowledge in such states, mutually supported by cohering 'C-evidence' which ascribes S-states to a subject. Basic beliefs can be justified not just by themselves but at least in part by their coherence relations with other beliefs. Justification goes up (from basic beliefs to non-basic beliefs) and back the way down again (as non-basic beliefs cohere with one another, and support the basic beliefs on which they rely). Basic beliefs justify non-basic beliefs, but then non-basic beliefs justify each other through their coherence (consistency or mutual derivability). These non-basic beliefs can then lend further support to the basic beliefs - in a virtuous circle of foundherentist justification! A problem with Haack's account is how basic beliefs can derive any justification at all from coherence with non-basic beliefs independently of the justification originated from basic beliefs. If basic beliefs have already done the justifying of non-basic beliefs, isn't non-basic beliefs' supporting basic beliefs just circular? Maybe, but maybe not: as Peirce once argued, these special chains of justification might be relations of 'mutual support', not simple 'circularity'. But as an alternative to the extremes of logical and sense-datum foundationalism, Haack's foundherentism is at least a promising alternative. As Haack puts it: foundherentism, 'without sacrificing objectivity, acknowledges something of how complex and confusing evidence can be'. Foundherentism might someday solve the dilemma of foundationalism's good form but poor content.

So it seems there must be some foundations for knowledge if our beliefs are to be justified. But these foundations might not be indubitable - they might rely on non-basic beliefs (as Haack claims) or on reliable cognitive processes (as Carruthers thinks). We can't definitely point to particular foundations, and we can't claim these foundations are totally secure. We can't be certain that knowledge has secure foundations. But in order to have justification at all, it seems there must be some kind of foundation - however secure that foundation may be.

Image sourced from Creative Commons.

Sunday, 12 March 2017

Word of the Week: Phenomenalism


George Berkeley - the founding father of phenomenalism

Note
This entry follows on from a previous entry on 'realism', which talked about the attitude that we can clearly and distinctly perceive the world as it really is, rather than as Trump wants it to look like! As you'll see, 'phenomenalism' is virtually the opposite. What do you think: are you a realist or phenomenalist? Please give your view in the comments section, and I'll do my best to respond!

Phenomenalism is undoubtedly one of the most radical responses to the problem of perception. In its rejection of the common-sense principles of naïve realism, phenomenalism is second only to idealism in its scepticism of the power of our senses at gaining access to the external world. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage for phenomenalists, who eliminate the problems of realism but at the cost of advancing counter-intuitive assumptions about the nature of perception. I contend that, despite phenomenalism’s clear advantages in contrast with naïve realism, the theory fails to clearly and simply model our sense experience. If phenomenalism is to survive, the theory should either be modified to taken into account its flaws or rejected in favour of one of the less radical solutions to the problem of perception (e.g., Russell’s representative realism). In reaching this conclusion, I shall address the following issues: firstly, the merits of the phenomenalist solution to the problem of perception; secondly, the difficulties with accepting the ‘traditional’ phenomenalism of Berkeley, Mill and Ayer; thirdly, the equally problematic ‘adverbial’ modification to phenomenalism. Then I shall reiterate my belief that phenomenalism, although giving a compelling critique of naïve realism, fails to provide the simplicity that realism, whether naïve or representative, provides.

Firstly, it is worth considering the problem that phenomenalists are trying to solve. Whilst our common-sense notion of perception suggests that, as John McDowell notes, our senses have ‘Openness to the world’ and the ordinary (physical) objects therein, it is clear that this is not always the case. Whilst we would like for our senses to be both open to the primary qualities of objects and aware of their existence apart from our own minds, we do not always have such direct perceptual contact with objects. In illusion, as Paul Snowden and C.D. Broad note, one is not aware of an ordinary object, or objects made up of physical matter. Since the same account of experience must apply to both veridical (correct) and illusory (incorrect or misleading) experiences, the conclusion that one is never perceptually aware of ordinary objects seems inevitable. Moreover, hallucinatory experience of an ordinary (material) object is not a case of awareness of an ordinary object. For instance, if one is dreaming of a flying multi-coloured teddy bear, this does not mean that we are actually aware of a multi-coloured teddy bear; rather, we are only aware of an idea of a teddy bear. As veridical and hallucinatory experiences are to be given the same account, it seems that one is never perceptually aware of ordinary objects in veridical experience, since hallucinatory perception is subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception. That is, if we are dreaming, we do not necessarily know that we are dreaming, so there is nothing obviously distinguishable between dream and reality. This is the problem of perception: we do not directly perceive ordinary objects in illusions and hallucinations, so we do not directly perceive ordinary objects in veridical experiences either.

Thus the problem of perception leads to a rejection of the common-sense, or naïve, assertion that we directly perceive the world. Phenomenalism attempts to solve this problem by introducing a new theory. Phenomenalists accept the arguments from illusion and hallucination as premises, and move from these premises to the conclusion that, as we do not directly perceive ordinary objects, we must perceive non-ordinary objects. These non-ordinary objects are ideas in our mind. For phenomenalists, these perceptual ideas can be called ‘sense data’, or the immaterial objects of sensation. In this way, we are indubitably and directly acquainted with sense data even when we are not directly acquainted with material ordinary objects. Instead of having awareness of ordinary objects, we are, as G.E. Moore and Howard Robinson contend, aware of non-ordinary sense data. Phenomenalism solves the problem of perception by rejecting naïve, or common-sense, realism, since it accepts the commonality between dreaming and being awake by admitting sense data as the omnipresent objects of perception. The problem of not being aware of ordinary objects does not apply for phenomenalists, since only non-ordinary objects are perceivable. So the chief merit of phenomenalism is its ingenious solution to the problem of perception.

However, the non-ordinary nature of sense data is simultaneously the greatest strength and most fundamental weakness of phenomenalism. George Berkeley unintentionally elucidated this weakness in phenomenalism. As Peter Millican notes, Berkeley read John Locke as saying that secondary qualities, or the qualities within objects which cause sensations in the subject (perceiver), are the sensations themselves. In other words, Berkeley took the phenomenalist position to its logical conclusion of denying the distinction between perceiver and perceived. He therefore viewed all qualities of object, be they primary (e.g., extension, solidity and other quantifiable properties) or secondary (e.g., sight, smell, or other obviously sensory properties), as sensations. Berkeley therefore maintained that a sentence such as ‘I see a camel’ states ‘I see an idea of a camel’ (my example). Hence Berkeley is regarded both as an ‘idealist’ and a ‘phenomenalist’. Objects do not really exist in themselves, because only ideas (sense data) are real for Berkeley. This led Berkeley to a total denial of the material world in favour of the idealist maxim that, regarding objects, ‘their esse is percipi’, or ‘their essence is to be perceived’ and not to exist. This leads to a complete scepticism of all claims to the existence of matter, which controversial amongst materialists (or physicalists) both in Berkeley’s day and today. Matter, it seems, is common sense for most people, and central to the doctrines of thinkers from Aristotle to Russell. Without matter, it is not clear how objects could really exist as simply sensations, since non-ordinary sense data are fleeting, whereas ordinary objects seem to be at least moderately permanent. This, therefore, represents a key problem for Berkeley’s phenomenalism, regarding how a phenomenalist can account for the endurance of objects when unperceived.

Berkeley himself solved this dilemma by postulating the existence of a deity who can perceive objects even when they are not perceived by anyone else. This explains why objects exist when unperceived by humans, since they still exist in the mind of God. As Ronald Knox acknowledged in his lyrical homage to Berkeley, even when a tree in a Quad is unperceived by any living thing, ‘the tree will continue to be, since [it is] observed by yours faithfully, God’. However, this presupposition of the existence of God fails to apply Ockham’s razor somewhat, since the postulation of a deity generates more epistemic assumptions than it explains. Put simply, God is an unnecessary element of a perceptual theory, since the existence of God, as with all things, should not be taken for granted. Therefore, the problem remains as to how phenomenalism explains the fact that material objects, even when unperceived, appear to endure. As Bertrand Russell reminds us, it would seem odd if, upon a cat’s passing from one part of the room to another, having been hidden from our view for some duration of its journey, someone said that the cat vanished. But this is what Berkeley would have to contend without postulating a deity: that the cat, when unperceived, truly vanished and, seemingly by magic, reappeared at another part of the room subsequently. In fact, it is quite clear that the more parsimonious model would accept that the cat, whether as an idea or ordinary object, actually endured. So if the cat endured when unperceived, and if objects in general exist when unperceived, the question remains: what are these objects, or sense data, which exist when unperceived?

J.S. Mill responded to this question by supposing that objects, rather than being physical objects or fleeting ideas, represent enduring possibilities of perception. Objects are indeed material, but matter, for Mill, ‘may be defined [as] a Permanent Possibility of Sensation’. Mill has solved the problem of enduring substance in the very definition of his theory, since matter is defined as ‘something which exists when we are not thinking of it; which existed before we had ever thought and would exist if we were annihilated’. Arguably, this solves the problem of enduring substance without resorting to realist claims about reality, since all we can perceive is a ‘set of appearances’. All properties of objects are, to use Locke’s terminology, ‘secondary’. There are no primary qualities, since such qualities could exist regardless of their ability to cause sensations in us. Secondary qualities, by contrast, are such that they necessarily cause sensations within us, such that ‘all attributes which we ascribe to objects consist in their having power of exciting one or another variety of sensation in our mind’. Only sense data exist for Mill, therefore, since only sense data can be perceived. But sense data are not physical themselves, and nor can we infer from sense data to unobserved non-mental objects. The only realm is the mental, or phenomenal. Nevertheless, Mill’s case is incomplete. He wants to say that objects are simultaneously temporary sense data and enduring possibilities of sense data. This is a paradox which is somewhat lacking in explanation. Mill does not answer the question regarding why, if sense data only temporarily exist in the mind of the perceiver, sense data have the power to reappear whenever observed. His account is therefore paradoxical, as it does not account for why permanent possibilities of sensation are ‘permanent’ or ‘possible’. A realist could just as easily reply that this permanency is derived from objects existing independently of the mind, lending little support to the phenomenalist case.

A.J. Ayer tried to bypass the problem with a different version of phenomenalism—namely, linguistic phenomenalism. Instead of trying to ask what objects are, Ayer asked what our statements about objects were, and thus found a way of dodging Mill’s paradoxes. He argued that ‘every empirical statement about a physical object’ is ‘reducible to a statement, or set of statements, which refer exclusively to sense-data’. Sense data, for Ayer, are not actual, material things. Sense data are Berkeleian ideas, similar to Mill’s permanent possibilities of sensation, but are linguistic rather than factual. Ayer therefore referred to the endurance of unperceived material objects, such as Russell’s disappearing cat, as reducible to a set of linguistic statements about possible sense data. To say that the cat exists when unperceived is to say that, were one in a suitable position, one would have a sense datum of a cat. However, this is complicated by Ayer’s denial of the linguistic significance of matter, since it is not possible to say that one is standing a suitable angle to observe the cat, as this presupposes the existence of ‘I’ and the spatial dimensions necessary for observation to take place. Instead, for Ayer, one must use conditional statements purely about sense data. Applying this to Russell’s cat, one would have to say that, were one to experience a sense datum of oneself being in a certain position, one would have the sense datum of a cat. This, however, makes the laws of physics seem coincidental, since an apple falling to the Earth is reducible to a statement about a sense datum of an apple, followed by a sense datum of an apple in a lower position, followed by a sense datum of an apple on the ground. Apart from being counter to the realist assumptions of science, this also over-complicates all talk about the world, as a phenomenalist can only talk about possible and actual sense data, rather then enduring physical objects. For each physical object, a phenomenalist refers to an infinite number of possible sense data. By failing Ockham’s parsimony (simplicity) test, Ayer’s phenomenalism demonstrates is impracticability.

Moving on to the third and final part of this discussion, it is worth considering the adverbial modification to phenomenalism and its usefulness. The theory is, amongst other things, a response to general problems with traditional phenomenalism, such as Roderick Chisholm’s ‘problem of the speckled hen’. According to this problem, a phenomenalist claims that all statements, including statements about number, are reducible to statements about sense data. However, the statement that a hen has ‘48 speckles’ is not thus reducible, since one’s estimation may be incorrect. The number ‘48’ is qualitatively indistinguishable from the numbers 47, 49 or 50. This forced Ayer into the position of denying the possibility of counting using sense data alone, since inductive inference (or rational thinking outside of mere acquaintance with sense data) is also needed to enumerate things. This has led adverbial phenomenalists to ask whether sense data exist at all, due to their lack of utility in the basic practice of counting. Adverbialists, such as Chisholm, C.G. Ducasse and Ned Block, contend that secondary qualities are instantiated, not as sense data, but as adverbs. These adverbs, as Gilbert Harman notes, are the ‘mental paint’ of perceptual experience, and allow us to perceive without the need for immaterial sense data or material objects. For an adverbial phenomenalist, to say ‘I see a pink gate’ is to say ‘I am seeing pinkly and gately’, since there is no object, be it a non-ordinary sense datum or ordinary object, to be perceived. There is only our experience and its intrinsic qualities, which are analogous to adverbs. However, adverbialism fails on two grounds. Firstly, it cannot explain why objects exist when unperceived, since seeing a pink gate recurrently is analogous to ‘sensing pinkly and gately’ at several different occasions, with total coincidence and no physical necessity. The fact that Russell’s cat reappears after travelling through a tunnel or emerging from a cave is, for an adverbial phenomenalist, a mere coincidence. Secondly, as Frank Jackson notes, to see a brown square and a green triangle is simply ‘sensing brownly and squarely and greenly and triangularly’. But this removes the association between ‘brown’ and square’, such that, on the adverbialist account, a brown square could be mistaken for a green triangle, and a green triangle could be mistaken for a brown square. So adverbialism cannot cope with multiple sensations at once.

Overall, phenomenalism is praiseworthy for its ingenious solution to the problem of perception, since it restricts our perception to non-ordinary (immaterial) phenomena rather than ordinary (material) objects. However, traditional phenomenalism fails at explaining why objects persist when unperceived: Berkeley posits a deity without first providing a coherent argument for such a being; Mill begs the question by failing to explain why sense data are ‘permanent possibilities of sensation’; and Ayer’s linguistic phenomenalism restricts all talk of physics to talk of possible sense data, making Newton’s celebrated laws seem like coincidences rather than the products of necessity (or, as we should say in today’s ‘Quantum age’, at least high probability). The attempt to rescue phenomenalism through adverbialism is similarly brittle when scrutinised properly. All in all, phenomenalism is insufficient at explaining the patterns of our perceptual experience. Perhaps realism should come to the rescue.

Sunday, 19 February 2017

Word of the Week: Realism (Philosophy)



Philosophical realism is the theory that there is a material world of 'ordinary objects' for us to perceive. In other words, realists think that there is some objective, physical reality out there - as opposed to just ideas in our minds. Realists, therefore, do not think that we are in the matrix, or mere brains in vats. However, realism has come under attack from various philosophers: some deny the existence of the material world completely (e.g., George Berkeley) or at least deny the possibility of a proof of the material world’s existence (e.g., Immanuel Kant). Perhaps more significantly, realism has come under attack from politicians: Donald Trump and his minions are intent on denying the validity of our senses. For instance, Kellyanne Conway (Counsellor to the President) recently made up a terrorist attack - the 'Bowling Green Massacre' (hint: it's fantasy) - despite the fact that such a terrorist attack was never seen or heard to take place. This situation, of resorting to mere ‘idealism’ where the world is just what we wish it to be, is what ‘realism’ tries so hard to avoid. Realists do this by affirming the possibility of veridical (truthful) experience of the material world. The likes of Plato and Trump would have us believe that both veridical and non-veridical are insignificant, since abstract 'ideas' are far more interesting, reliable and entertaining (well, at least for Trump...). But realists have set out at solving this Trumpist dilemma.

Nevertheless, realism is not without challenges, and has descended into a conflict between representative realists who assert that our perceptions indirectly represent reality and naïve realists who assert that we can be directly aware of reality. I argue that a realist theory of perception can only be properly upheld in a representative way. However, even from that standpoint, representative realists must produce a justification of why our perceptions represent reality at all. If such an argument is not proposed, then representative realism decays into mere idealism. In that vein, I will start with evaluating the aptly named theory of naïve realism before progressing onto representative realism in the second part of my critical analysis. This should facilitate a judgement as to whether it is indeed impossible to uphold a realist theory of perception.

Naïve realism is built upon the foundations that common sense provides, as Bertrand Russell (1912) and Crane and French (2017) note. This common-sense view itself is a realist theory of perception. Therefore, we can begin our analysis of naïve realism with an analysis of its foundations in common sense. The common-sense view of perception tends to assert two axioms, one of which concerns Openness and the other of which concerns Awareness. As John McDowell notes, the first axiom means that we have ‘Openness to the world’, which comes in three ways: firstly, mind-independence, or the idea that, when we perceive objects, we are perceiving objects that are independent of our minds; secondly, presence, or responsiveness to the way things are now, such that a perception of a table means that we are responding to a real, present, material table; thirdly, transparency, or perception only of mind-independent objects and absolutely nothing else. The doctrine of Awareness is defined in roughly the same way as Openness, with the caveat that humans are in actual perceptual contact with objects. For instance, according to Awareness, if we say that we perceive a table, then a common sense realist would say that we are directly aware of the object, with no need for any intermediary sense-data or representations to provide ‘stepping stones’ for us.

Martin Heidegger (1977 [1950]) noted the merits of this approach by acknowledging that we never ‘originally and really perceive a throng of sensations, e.g. tones and noises, in the appearance of things’; ‘rather, we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-engine aeroplane’. Therefore, when we hear ‘the door slam in the house’, we are hearing the actual door slamming and ‘never hear acoustic sensations or mere sounds’. This has the advantage that we are not acquainted with mere sensations of mental sense-data, but instead are acquainted with, to use a Kantian phrase, ‘things-in-themselves’. Thus common-sense realism allows us to find truths about reality itself, and not just our subjective perceptions. (Hence the materialist maxim of phenomenologists such as Heidegger: ‘To the things themselves!’)

However, whilst Openness and Awareness are both ‘common sense’, there are a number of philosophical problems with both axioms. In particular, the third element of Openness—namely, that we perceive objects with total and utter ‘transparency’—runs contrary to the evidence. To say that we perceive with transparency implies that any variation in our sense-experience can be explained with reference to some variation in the actual objects themselves. For instance, if a white light were shone on a green object from a certain angle, then a common-sense realist would have no choice but to say that the green object has actually turned white. This is obviously not the case – the object is still green from whatever perspective of the observer and whatever lighting is applied to the object.

Nevertheless, academic naïve realists, rather than common-sense naïve realists, solve this problem by admitting three ways in which Openness does not always equate to total ‘transparency’. Firstly, as Heather Logue (2012) argued, variations in the perceiver, such as whether the perceiver is wearing pink-tinted glasses, can lead to variations in one’s perceptions which are not present in things-in-themselves. Secondly, as John Campbell (2009) and Bill Brewer (2011) noted, there are certain conditions of perception, such as angle of the object relative to the perceiver, that can generate illusions, such as the anamorphic skull in Holbein’s The Ambassadors. Thirdly, as M.G.F. Martin (1998) and Matthew Soteriou (2000) noted, the way in which we view an object can generate illusions in our perceptions, such as looking at a cup of tea from an ‘upside-down’ perspective, generating the illusion that the liquid in the tea is suspended in the air. Although these responses are, in my view, essentially the same (as they argue that changes in the relationship between objects and perceiver can impact on the perception of the objects) they succeed in saving academic naïve realism from some of the more obviously naïve claims of its common-sense counterpart.

Yet academic naïve realism is dealt a fatal blow by appliers of the arguments ‘from illusion’ and ‘from hallucination’, such as Howard Robinson, C.D. Broad, J.J. Valberg and P.F. Snowdon. Moreover, representative realists such as Howard Robinson have melded the two arguments against naïve realism to also argue for representative realism. The argument progresses as follows:
(A) Base Case: (a) illusions and hallucinations are not really cases of awareness of ordinary objects; but rather (b) are cases of awareness of non-ordinary (i.e. non-material) sense-data.
(B) Spreading Step: veridical experiences, illusions and hallucinations are all to be given the same account.
(C) Conclusions: (c) no perceptual experience is the case of awareness of an ordinary object; bur rather (d) all perceptual experiences are the cases of awareness of non-ordinary sense-data.
From the apparently obvious premise (A), representative realists have demonstrated that we never have direct awareness of ordinary objects and instead always have direct awareness of non-ordinary sense-data. Sense-data, for our purposes, are (1) objects of direct awareness, (2) bearers of sensible qualities (i.e. that we can ‘sense’ or ‘perceive’), and (3) objects of a radically different ontological kind from ordinary objects (i.e. rather, they are non-ordinary objects). Sense-data, therefore, are the immaterial, mental representations of the material, non-mental reality beyond.

However, a naïve realist, who would prefer us to directly perceive reality rather than indirectly perceive it via sense-data, could attack the Base Case of the argument. Firstly, a naïve realist would argue against the notion in (A)(a) that ‘illusions are not really cases of awareness of ordinary objects’. (Note that the naïve realist is ignoring the argument ‘from hallucination’ for now and is concentrating on the argument from illusion’). Naïve realist Bill Brewer (2011) argues that an object, under certain material conditions, will appear to us in an illusory way. For instance, the placement of a pencil at an angle into a glass of water may make the pencil appear bent. For Brewer, we are still aware of the pencil, but the pencil is placed in such a way that it appears as if it is bent. It is not sense-data that tell us this, but the physics of refraction that tell us this. Therefore, Brewer contends, we are still directly aware of the ordinary object, albeit in an illusory way. On this basis, a naïve realist contends, the Base Case collapses and the argument against naïve realism and for representative realism falls apart. Nevertheless, even if illusions are still cases of direct awareness of ordinary objects, the argument contra naïve realism might still work on the basis of hallucinations: all that is needed is one base case of non-awareness of ordinary objects, whether that involves illusions or hallucinations, for the argument to suggest that we never have awareness of ordinary objects. Therefore, for naïve realist to uphold their case, they have to also take down the part of the argument that deals with hallucinations, or totally non-veridical experiences, such as dreams.

J.M. Hinton (1973) and John McDowell (1982, 1987) try to take down the Spreading Step’s notion that ‘veridical experiences […] and hallucinations are all to be given the same account’. To do this, they propose the disjunctive theory, which suggests that there is something intrinsically different about veridical experiences from hallucinations. Veridical experiences are cases of direct awareness of ordinary objects whereas illusory experiences are not cases of direct awareness of ordinary objects. (Of course, therefore, naïve realists have to accept the Base Case on this one, so they are just attacking the Spreading Step.) Therefore, for naïve realists, we cannot accept the Spreading Step’s principle of giving ‘the same account’ to both illusory and veridical experiences, since they are intrinsically different, or ‘disjunctive’. However, veridical and illusory experiences are often subjectively indistinguishable. For instance, if one is hallucinating that one is looking at a polar bear in the Arctic, then this hallucination may be as vivid as a genuine perception of a polar bear in the Arctic. Or, at the very least, it is very difficult to tell when one is dreaming and when one is not. Consequently, it seems that the argument from disjunctivism falls on its basic assertion that there is something that obviously distinguishes hallucinatory from veridical experiences for the perceiver. As Delia Graff argues, hallucinations feel, for the perceiver, almost identical to veridical experience, such that the Spreading Step is correct in assuming ‘that veridical experiences, illusions and hallucinations are all to be given the same account.’

Therefore, it seems that representative realists have the theory with the greatest explanatory power: when we are having hallucinatory experiences, representative realism teaches that the reason why the experience is so vivid is that we are really and directly acquainted with objects. These objects, however, are just sense-data, which may or may not correspond with the real world. A.J. Ayer, for instance, contended that all experiences can be explained in terms of sense-data. However, sense-datum theorists such as Ayer have admitted that sometimes this would involve (using Robert Nozick’s terminology) ‘subjective conditionals’. For instance, a subjective conditional might involve the claim that ‘if I were standing high on the right side of Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors, then I would see an accurate painting of the human skull’ but ‘if I were looking front-on at Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors, then I would see a strange, grey, distorted shape’. In the case of this painting, subjective conditionals must be employed to explain why the skull is anamorphic, i.e. it appears in different shapes from different perspectives. However, this suggests that the conditionals must always hold, which is implausible if sense-data are just mental cognitions. If sense-data are mental, then our perceptions should be chaotic and dream-like, without a tangible pattern. This requires a representative realist to posit the existence of the material world to be perceived, such that veridical experiences are still veridical and illusory experiences are still illusory. However, as A.J. Ayer notes, there is no a priori proof for the existence of material ordinary objects. Nevertheless, we can assume that such objects exist, as they make uniform perception possible. In other words, we can pragmatically but not logically demonstrate the existence of material objects. Without such an assumption, science would have to assume that objects, when unperceived, might not really exist; with such an assumption, we can happily leave our homes without worrying that the homes will vanish when we are not perceiving them. In a way, the existence of matter is, to use Kantian terminology, ‘empirically real’ for all scientific purposes, but, for want of a logical proof, ‘transcendentally ideal’.

On balance, representative realism deals naïve realism a fatal blow with the arguments from illusion and hallucination. Even though illusions can be explained by naïve realists as examples of direct awareness of ordinary objects under certain material conditions, hallucinations are clearly non-veridical and, at the same time, subjectively indistinguishable from veridical experiences. Representative realism solves this dilemma by explaining all experience in terms of sense-data and not just ordinary objects. Representative realism, however, similarly lacks any a priori demonstration of its veracity. Nevertheless, there certainly are a multitude of a posteriori indications of the plausibility of representative realism, as its axioms are presupposed in much scientific activity. Pragmatically, realism is absolutely necessary lest we admit that objects may magically vanish if they are not being perceived. Realism may not be a perfect theory, both in its naïve and not-so-naïve forms, but it certainly is not impossible to uphold a realist theory of perception. So the Trumpists may have lost - the real world does exist, perception can give us veridical experiences, and truth matters.