Friday 9 June 2017

Great powers, superpowers and America


Is America a superpower, or just a great power? It certainly dominates other states in its naval might, as this image of the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier demonstrates. The UK, by contrast, has 0 aircraft carriers.

A great power is a political entity which exercises significant international influence and military strength. Within a given system of polities, great powers collectively possess a near monopoly of politico-military muscle. Traditionally, the great powers of the European states system set the rules by which international relations were to be managed. For instance, following the Thirty Years War a series of treaties signed by great powers in Westphalia set down the rules of the road for great and not-so-great powers alike. Similarly, the War of the Seventh Coalition concluded in 1815 with the Congress of Vienna, which arranged a new set of rules by which international society was to be organised. After 1919, the victorious great powers – France, Britain and the United States – drew up another set of rules. Therefore, great powers, as well as possessing a monopoly over hard power, which can be used militarily, also possess a substantial amount of soft power, or the economic, diplomatic and persuasive ability to influence the behaviour of other states. Soft power may be exercised through, amongst other things, drafting and signing important treaties.

A superpower, however, does not tend to share power so diversely. Whilst a given states system may have up to 20 great powers (as is the case with the G20 in the modern states system), there will only tend to be one or two superpowers. Generally, one superpower will tend to dominate a system – if, that is, superpowers exist at all. This single superpower may incorporate other states into its own imperium or, at the very least, ‘sphere of influence’. However, as was the case during the Cold War, there may be two superpowers. A superpower, therefore, is a transcendent power on the world stage.

Nevertheless, just as different great powers may have different areas of expertise, so may different superpowers have different areas in which they exercise hegemony, or dominance. For instance, it is arguable that China is currently just an economic – rather than a politico-military – superpower. It is the largest emitter of carbon dioxide and has the second largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for a single-state entity, standing at $11.2. Although this lags behind the European Union’s GDP of $16.4T, the EU is a multistate entity, and thus does not have as much political clout as China, which has a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, both China and the EU have small economies in comparison with the US, which has a GDP of $18.6T.

The US, moreover, is perhaps the only all-round superpower in 2017. Whilst the Cold War featured a clash between two superpowers  - the US and the USSR – today only the US controls its region of the world. Therefore, the US is, to use John Mearsheimer’s term, the only ‘regional hegemon’ on Earth. Whilst the Cold War was bipolar, to some extent America’s superpower status has shifted the world towards an era of unipolarity, where only one power is dominant. But America’s superpower status should not be exaggerated. Admittedly, in 2014 its economy amounted to nearly a quarter of global GDP and it spent $596B on defence on 2015, which was more than double China’s total of $215B. Nevertheless, even if it is a global superpower, the US is certainly not a global hegemon. To be a hegemon, as Mearsheimer and R. Harrison Wagner acknowledge, America would need to be able to defeat any combination of other powers in a given confrontation. But as its military spending in 2014 amounted to only 43% of the global total, this would not be enough to defeat all other states combined. Perhaps, therefore, the US remains a modest superpower, without the capacity to exercise total global dominance. Far from it: the US was unable to stop Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, as well as the seizure of Mosul by so-called Islamic State three months later.

Nevertheless, the global reach of the US, although not characteristic of a global hegemon, is certainly characteristic of a superpower. Whilst America’s soft power has declined – particularly following President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris climate accord on 1 June 2017 – its hard power remains intact. After the Syrian government launched the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack on 4 April 2017, the US launched a Thomahawk cruise missile strike three days later. Syria has not dared to launch any chemical attacks since. Thus the US is capable of using targeted unilateral force with devastating effect.

On balance, therefore, the US remains a superpower to this day. But it nevertheless ‘has been in a state of almost continuous relative decline since the end of World War II’ (Antony Best et al, 2015). It is certainly a great power, and retains its superpower status thanks to its being ahead of any other state in crude economic, political and military terms. Nevertheless, in none of these areas does it exercise hegemony. Even America’s status as the world’s only regional hegemon may soon be cast away by a resurgent Middle Kingdom. America may be a superpower, but it is far from an unlimited one.

Word of the Week: Norms




Alexander VI: the normative Pope? (Creative Commons)

Traps and Norms

In previous posts, I have tried to investigate the underlying explanation for the Thucydides trap, or the hypothesis that, when a rising power confronts a ruling power, war becomes quite probable. This week, I ask which theory of international relations offers the best explanation for one particular case of peace enduring, despite the fact that a rising power (Spain) confronted a ruling power (Portugal) in the late 15th century AD. This is one of the Belter Center's 16 examples of the Thucydides trap. I find that social norms appear to play a part in explaining why the Thucydides trap did not spring in this particular case. 

Norms are patterns of behaviour. They have a descriptive element and a prescriptive element. One the one hand, norms describe patterns of behaviour, e.g. the respect that European states demonstrated for the Pope. On the other hand, norms prescribe patterns of behaviour, e.g. the respect that European states thought they ought to demonstrate for the Pope. Employing the constructivist theory of international relations, I argue that norms restrained the warlike tendencies of the Thucydides trap in the late 15th century. Nevertheless, there are many other possible explanations for why peace endured between Spain and Portugal against the odds, which I shall look at shortly. But first, before I look at the explanation for peace between Portugal and Spain, it's worth briefly describing how close Portugal and Spain got to war, and what they did to avoid it.

Portugal and Spain

In the late 15th century, Portugal, the 'ruling power' (according to Professor Allison's schema) began to feel threatened by the 'rising power' that was the Catholic monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella, who had in 1469 united the crowns of Castile and Aragon. Since the days of Henry the Navigator, the mid-15th century Portuguese prince with exploratory ambitions, Portugal had aspired to be the world's dominant sea power. But now its neighbour was on the rise. In 1492, Ferdinand and Isabella completed their reconquest of the final emirate of the Iberian peninsula - Granada. That same year, Christopher Columbus reached the New World in 1492 with Spanish backing, after being spurned by Portuguese King John II. The balance of power 'changed almost overnight', and Portugal and Spain were set to fall into Thucydides's timeless trap.

However, the trap did not spring, and peace endured between Portugal and Spain. In 1494, Pope Alexander VI helped negotiate the Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal, giving Portugal access to India and Africa whilst giving Spain access to most of the Americas, as the dividing line between the Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence was the 46th meridian. Generally, lands discovered west of the meridian were to be Spanish, whereas lands discovered east of the meridian were to be Portuguese. It turned out that Portugal had pulled the short straw and got the worse end of the deal. Nevertheless, it provided the Portuguese with some comfort that the Spanish would recognise their territorial rights, allowing both powers to remain comfortable with their respective spheres of conquest.


Explaining the peace

How was the Thucydides trap avoided? This is difficult for the offensive realist, since one would presume that, if Spain really wanted to become hegemonic at sea, it would want to displace Portuguese power totally rather than reaching a compromise. Perhaps for the defensive realist the Treaty of Tordesillas makes sense, as it clearly delineated the limits of Spanish power, thus making Portugal comfortable that the balance of power remained in equilibrium. Thus the theory of  defensive (structural) realism offers the more convincing realist case on why the Thucydides trap did not have the effects that it had on Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC. Perhaps what makes realism most convincing is that King John II was unprepared for another war with Spain.

But structural realism only looks at part of the picture.  Indeed, Portugal and Spain were trying to enhance their security in the Treaty of Tordesillas. But they were also trying to exploit the new world for prestige, and Tordesillas was not just a security treaty but also a 'charter of empire', allowing each power to go about conquering foreign lands unhindered (Disney, 2009). This supports classical realism, since prestige was more important than power in preventing the descent to war. 

Social constructivism has some backing. Spain was exhausted from its conquest of Granada and fearful of a repetition of the Wars of the Castilian Succession of 1475 - 79. This made Spain wary of war, due to its internal inhibitions and sentimental constraints on going to war again. Perhaps Isabella and Ferdinand thought that they could not justify yet another protracted war to their people. Nevertheless, this idea is, in the end, a flawed one: from 1500 to 1504, Spain was fighting with France for control of Naples, which was a fight that Spain won. Spain was, therefore, not prepared to stay at peace for the sake of peace. More realistic is the final possibility, from societal constructivism.

According to societal constructivists, like classical realists, inter-state sociology is important. Ideas such as prestige, respect, extravaganza and magisterial authority are far more significant than money, resources and power according to societal constructivists. The fact is that the international society of the time was oriented around papal authority. As such, when Alexander VI demanded a settlement, Spain and Portugal felt compelled, as fellow Catholic powers, to conform to the demands of their international society. They wanted to be good Christian members of Christendom, so did what they could to avoid war. The norm of Christian behaviour, in the end, may have been what drove Portugal and Spain to unite. 

As economic interdependence was not at its heights in the 15th century, and as neither Portugal nor Spain was democratic, the liberal theories of economic interdependence and democratic peace can be brushed aside. Therefore, on balance, the strongest three theories emerging from this case are:

Defensive (structural) realism;
Classical realism;
Societal constructivism.

Indeed, these three theories can be complementary, and no one of them need take precedence over the others. The material factors underpinning defensive realism, for instance, may be compatible with the sociological take of constructivists. Both survival and ideas were on the agenda of Spain and Portugal, suggesting that defensive realism, classical realism and societal constructivism can all offer lessons for explaining Thucydides's trap. 

Restraints on the trap

The norms of prestige and good behaviour, seen through these last two theories, were perhaps, therefore, the most important causes of peace in the Iberian peninsula. This means that the Thucydides trap, at least in this case, can be restrained by circumstances in which 

(a) war is unfeasible or unwinnable in the perception of both sides, 
(b) war risks decreasing, rather than increasing, the prestige of either state, or
(c) international society is structured in such a way that war would violate fundamental norms of good behaviour.

Which one of these circumstances has the greatest effect on restraining the Thucydides trap is a subject for future posts, when I hope to look at some of the Belfer Center's other case studies. As Professor Allison's team does not put immediate emphasis on theories such as constructivism, I hope that my analysis provides a broader look at what the mechanisms are for restraining the Thucydides trap. Providing an explanation for the age-old trap perhaps might prove useful for policymakers, who must avoid it ensnaring the United States and China. The alternative, if the historical record is reliable, is war.

References

Disney, A.R. (2009), A history of Portugal and the Portuguese empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harvard Thucydides’s Trap Project (2015 onwards), ‘Thucydides’s Trap Case File’. Available online at: http://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/resources/case-file-graphic