Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts

Sunday, 26 February 2017

Word of the Week: Devolution

The affirmative outcomes of the Scottish and Welsh devolution referenda in September 1997, as well as the Northern Irish referendum on the Belfast Agreement in May 1998, gave democratic legitimacy to a new programme of devolution. But how much of an impact has devolution had on the extent to which the Westminster parliament is sovereign? (This builds on my post on sovereignty.) I argue that, whilst legal sovereignty (the main subject of my previous post) rests in the UK Parliament at Westminster, political sovereignty is divided amongst the assemblies and parliaments of the United Kingdom. The impact of devolution on the principle and practice of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ has, therefore, been significant, albeit limited in extent. To elucidate my next discussion of the politico-legal roles of the devolved legislatures, let's begin with an overview of how sovereignty works in the UK.

As A.V. Dicey affirmed in 1889, ‘The sovereignty of Parliament is, from a legal point of view, the dominant characteristic of our political institutions.’ This was preceded by Thomas Hobbes’s view of the sovereign as a ‘Mortal God’ with unified, indivisible authority. Hobbes and Dicey reflect the traditional concept of the sovereign as the foundation of legal authority from which all legitimate political power flows. Parliamentary sovereignty, as it is traditionally conceived, constitutes this supreme and indivisible foundation. Legally, this view seems reasonable, since statute law is formed by Parliament, and not by any other body. So Parliament might have legal sovereignty, or sovereignty over the formation of legislation. Politically, however, there are limitations on parliamentary sovereignty. Thus Parliament might not have unfettered political sovereignty, or sovereignty over decisions which have significant social, economic or political impacts. The European Union, for instance, upholds the supremacy of EU law: in the ‘Factortame vs. Secretary of State for Transport’ case, the House of Lords ruled that courts could ‘disapply’ statute law in favour of EU law. However, since the EU has legal competence simply due to the UK ratifying EU law in the European Communities Act of 1972, Parliament to some extent is still sovereign: after Parliament voted by 498 votes to 114 in favour of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, it is clear that Parliament has, all along, retained its ability to withdraw from the EU and thus reject EU law. So Parliament appears to have legal sovereignty, even though it does not have sufficient political sovereignty to initiate legislation or challenge EU law while it upholds the European Communities Act.

Nevertheless, perhaps executive dominance of the legislature has limited parliamentary sovereignty. The Conservative majorities of +144 and +101 in 1983 and 1987 gave Margaret Thatcher’s Government excessive control over the legislature, effectively controlling Parliament. Tony Blair’s majorities of +179 from 1997 and +167 from 2001 give further weight to this idea. However, as the Government must be, at least in large part, drawn from the legislature (in that most cabinet members and ministers tend to be Members of the House of Commons) it seems that the executive cannot bypass parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament, in the context of EU law and executive power, appears to retain its legal sovereignty.

Having elucidated the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, let's now progress to look at whether devolution has affected the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. The creation of the ‘Stormont’ Northern Irish Assembly may lend some justification to the view that parliamentary sovereignty has been eroded. The Westminster Government acknowledges the rights of Stormont to create legislation in certain policy areas, such as agriculture, the environment, health, enterprise, investment, social services, justice and policy. So Stormont is capable of forming legislation that, before its formation, would have been Westminster’s responsibility. For instance, the new Road Traffic (Amendment) Act is set to make Northern Irish drink-driving law harsher than the rest of the UK, lowering drink-driving limits by 40%. At the ‘Holyrood’ Scottish Parliament, moreover, a ban on hunting with dogs was introduced in 2001, 4 years ahead of England and Wales. What is more: Holyrood, in time for the June 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, passed the Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Act, making Scotland the first nation of the UK to allow 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in elections. Also, Holyrood has powers over economic development, some tax-raising powers, social security, justice, education, agriculture, forestry, fishing, inter alia (amongst other things). Furthermore, following the Government of Wales Act (2006), the ‘Senned’ Welsh Assembly can legislate on policy areas such as agriculture, education, fishing, housing, fire and rescue service, transport, and economic development. Since devolved administrations can exercise these legislative powers in certain policy areas, often to the partial exclusion of Westminster, it is arguable that parliamentary sovereignty is being eroded, since Westminster politicians cannot vote on matters dealt with by the devolved administrations exclusively.

However, although Westminster generally does not involve itself in the affairs of devolved administrations, it nevertheless retains the legal right to make statutes which overturn the measures of Stormont, Holyrood or Senned. Statute law, or law that's initiated by HM Government and ratified by Westminster, takes legal precedence over the legislation of the devolved administrations. Westminster’s primary legislation, in other words, is still primary, and thus the Westminster Parliament still has legal sovereignty. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the fact that political sovereignty is divided up among the four nations of the UK, such that the devolution of powers to Stormont, Holyrood and Senned has had a lasting political impact on the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. In section 3.1 of the White Paper on ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union’, the UK Government contends that the devolved administrations are engaged in the preparation for the delivery of ‘Brexit’. So the Westminster Parliament has forfeited some of its political sovereignty to the devolved legislatures, since it requires at least minimal acquiescence from the devolved legislatures in areas such as fundamental constitutional reform. Although MP David Davis chairs the Joint Ministerial Committee for European Negotiations, or JMC(EN), this is also attended by ministers from each of the devolved administrations. Moreover, the UK Government argued in section 3.5 of the Brexit White Paper that, after the UK’s exit from the EU, the devolved assemblies will see their share of political sovereignty enhanced: the Government will ‘use the opportunity of bringing decision making back to the UK to ensure that more decisions are devolved.’

Nevertheless, the Stormont administration has not yet published its own White Paper on Brexit, partly due to the fact that the power sharing agreement collapsed following Sinn Féin’s outrage at the failure of the Renewable Heat Incentive, which is set to cost up to half a billion pounds. Thus the stability at Westminster enables it to dominate the UK both legally and politically, thus enhancing the notion that Parliament is sovereign. Moreover, although the primary objective of both Senned’s and Holyrood’s White Papers was continuing participation in the Single Market, this is unlikely to be accepted by Whitehall in negotiations or Westminster in its votes on these negotiations: PM Theresa May, in her speech on 17 January 2017 entitled ‘A Global Britain’, said that the disadvantages of free movement of people made membership of the Single Market disadvantageous for the UK. Therefore, perhaps Westminster retains both legal sovereignty and, in large part, political sovereignty. However, it must equally be acknowledged that, although political sovereignty is distributed most densely at Westminster, the May 2015 General Election gave the Holyrood administration a partial say on statute law created by Westminster. Through the election of 56 Scottish National Party MPs to the Westminster Parliament, as well as the SNP’s winning a plurality of seats after the June 2016 Holyrood elections, Holyrood and SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon now has the ability to influence Westminster parliamentary scrutiny. Therefore, although Holyrood is subservient to Westminster, in reality the Holyrood Government can, through performing well in Westminster elections, also have political influence over Westminster.


Overall, it seems that legal sovereignty still rests in the Westminster Parliament, as section 2.1 of the Government’s EU White Paper acknowledges. Political sovereignty, however, is somewhat divided amongst Westminster, Senned, Holyrood and Stormont. But this is not to say that political sovereignty is equally divided amongst the four legislatures of the UK. Political sovereignty, for the most part, rests at Westminster. Therefore the impact on the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament of the granting of legislatures to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland has been smaller than, say, the impact of EU membership on parliamentary sovereignty. But this is not to say that the impact of devolution, however small, is not significant. Rather, the significance of the (unequal) division of political sovereignty amongst different legislatures continues to require the consent, or at least minimal acquiescence, of devolved legislatures in certain policy areas, including devolved areas such as education as well as major constitutional reform. So the impact on the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament of devolution since 1999 has been relatively small but nonetheless significant.

Wednesday, 25 January 2017

Work of the Week: Democracy


The meaning of the word has never been fully clear, and its centrality to constitutions even less firm. I argue that democracy began its definitive process in antiquity, and continued it in Renaissance times, especially in Britain. But Britain, despite creating democracy’s definition, has often failed to fully grasp its essence. The path of true democracy never did run smooth…

Although a Greek word, democracy as we know it was not too favourable to the Ancient Greeks. Even the liberally minded Aristotle called democracy a ‘deviant’ constitutional arrangement, since it let the poor and uneducated rule over the rich and educated.[1] But his advocacy of a mixed constitution—a ‘polity’ of middle-class citizens ruling over the ‘polis’ or city-state—reflected the participatory nature of Athens at the time, where a large number of citizens could participate in the decision-making process. The Romans found this form of ‘direct democracy’ rather difficult to implement in a large empire, so used an early form of ‘representative democracy’ instead, where the ‘people and the senate of Rome’ (senatus populusque romanus: SPQR) was the empire’s banner.[2]

Two millennia later, one former part of the Roman Empire was re-discovering its political roots. But, despite its ‘renaissance’, England was simultaneously redefining democracy. Having created a Parliament which was beginning to hold the monarch to account on a number of issues, the little country was allowing obscure, poor people like Thomas Cromwell rise to become powerful figures in British politics. The ‘deviant’ constitution of democracy was beginning to take hold, and by the 20th century, ordinary people were allowed to vote regularly, secretly and freely on their chosen representative in government from a particular political party. Although the American founding father James Maddison beat the British to a ‘bill of rights’, constitutionally embodied rights for all British citizens were made explicit in the 1998 Human Rights Act, while the media and judiciary had already gained their independence. Hence, the British created a de facto definition for democracy as a system of (1) regular elections involving the secret ballot and different participating parties[3], (2) a broad spectrum of liberties, and (3) an independent media and judiciary. There is no objective definition of democracy, apart from the word’s etymology as a system where the ‘people’ (demos) have some impact on their ‘ruling’ (kratos). But there certainly is a subjective definition which can be agreed upon by, at the very least, the countries where ancient and modern democracy originated—namely, the European and North American states.

Nevertheless, the British have never owned the essence of democracy as a representative institution.[4] Hence, it is unsurprising that there are some essential flaws in the British ‘democratic’ system that, although meeting the definition of democracy, fail to fully grasp its essence. One such flaw, forming part of the UK’s democratic deficit, is the omnipresence of the monarch. The use of a possessive pronoun in Her/His Majesty’s Government is blatantly at odds with the concept of democracy as an institution of shared sovereignty. Whereas Thomas Hobbes[5] or Niccolò Machiavelli[6] would have approved of the ability of the Queen to oversee governmental policy and maintain her ability to intervene, the American ‘founding fathers’[7] most probably would not have approved. The Queen’s very job description as a monarch can be seen as a philosophical insult to democracy: the Queen may not be what democracy really ‘stands for’.[8] Nevertheless, the Queen lacks de facto political power, in that she does not have the ability to change legislation, influence who gets elected to the legislature, or select who forms the decision-making Government. Therefore, the Queen may be a symbol of monarchy, but would probably not be seriously understood to be a ruling monarch by Plato, Aristotle or Hobbes.

Furthermore, although meeting democracy’s definition, another institution undermining democracy’s essence in the UK is ‘first past the post’ (FPTP). Under this system, the House of Commons is made up of representatives from each British constituency, meaning that, if the largest party’s votes were equally distributed, it is possible that a party will win every single seat with, say, 52% of the vote. Although this never happens, since different parts of the UK vote differently, anomalies are frequent. For instance, the Liberal Democrats won only 1% of the seats with 8% of the May 2015 general election vote. By contrast, the Conservatives won 51% of the seats with only 37% of the overall vote. Therefore, a Conservative vote was more powerful than a Liberal Democratic vote, meaning that the Conservatives benefited disproportionately from FPTP whereas Liberal Democrats suffered disproportionately. In essence, this undermines to some extent the democratic principle of ‘one person one vote’ (OPOV), since someone’s voting power is largely dependent on where they live in the country. Of course, FPTP’s advantage is that it allows MPs to represent their region, not just their party, but Germany solves the problem by having a two-tier political system of regional representatives chosen by regional elections and national representatives chosen by a proportional part list system (an ‘additional member’ system).

On the other hand, the essence of democracy is thoroughly grasped by the embedding of democratic institutions. For instance, despite the fact that the Polity Project[9] ranked the UK as a democracy beforehand, the 1969 Representation of the People Act secured the democratic institutions of OPOV, secret ballot and regular elections. Moreover, continual consolidation of democratic institutions shows that the UK has grasped democracy’s essence and that democratic norms are still alive and well. In 2011, another Act of Parliament made sure that elections were held on a regular basis—every five years—demonstrating that UK governments continue to pursue a democratic UK in both mere definition and essence. This reflects the reality that democracy appears to form a continuum, where even ‘democracies’ can be more or less democratic.

Overall, democracy is a state-level institution defined by its comprising the following intra-state institutions: (1) competitive, regularly-held elections with a secret ballot with a choice of multiple parties; (2) independent media and judiciary; and (3) a variety of rights and liberties. The UK is definitively a democracy, since it contains these structures, but it lacks some total democracy in some areas. Although the institutions are generally present, sometimes democratic norms such as completely independent media fail to operate. Also, although one person has one vote, sometimes the FPTP system denies the practical effectiveness of this principle by favouring certain geographical regions. Moreover, the culture of secrecy lives on. Overall, therefore, the definition of democracy was met by the UK in the early twentieth century with universal suffrage, but the essence of democracy was yet to be fully consolidated. Indeed, it is democracy’s essence to be continually improving and continually consolidating, as mistakes appear to be part of human nature. Therefore, even if a ‘perfect democracy’ is never achieved in the UK, a ‘good’ one certainly can by maintaining the political desire to make HM Government more representative, more responsible, and more accountable to the people of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.





[1] Miller, F. (2008). Aristotle's political theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/
[2] Crick, B. (2002). Democracy: a very short introduction (Vol. 75). Oxford Paperbacks.
[3] This constitutes ‘representative democracy’.
[4] Op cit.
[5] Hobbes, T. (2006 [1651]). Leviathan. A&C Black.
[6] Machiavelli, N. (2010 [1532]). The prince. University of Chicago Press.
[7] Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., & Goldman, L. (2008). The federalist papers. Oxford University Press.
[8] Docherty, I. (2016). The Queen: cherished but not chosen? INK, Issue 11. Retrieved from: http://www.inkstudents.co.uk/article/the-queen-cherished-but-not-chosen
[9] Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2015). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2015. Center for Systematic Peace.

Sunday, 22 January 2017

Will History End?

The following is an extract from my article on the end of history, published on 8 January 2017:

“History” is an ambiguous word, albeit a common one. But defining history’s limits is worthwhile, as we all partake in history’s course every time we speak to a friend, write a letter or send a meme on Facebook. For philosophers Hegel, Kant and Marx, history was the history of ideas. In this way, if humanity agreed upon a common idea of how to organise society - be it freedom, democracy or communism - history could end. So will history end?

To read on, please visit: http://www.inkstudents.co.uk/article/will-history-end

Wednesday, 18 January 2017

Word of the Week: Sovereignty


S
overeignty, whatever the word means, matters. From the monarchs of Renaissance Europe to the populists of Brexit Britain and Trumpist America, mere political control has never been enough. Instead, legal sovereignty has been the ultimate prize for monarchs, aristocrats and democrats down the ages. Today, the issue is more pressing than ever. Not only does the United Kingdom want to leave the European Union after its fateful referendum on 23 June 2016, but also, as of 17 January 2017, now desires to leave the Single Market for the sake of taking back 'sovereignty'. Thus the word, given its relevance, needs some elucidation. 

In 1576, Jean Bodin wrote Les Six livres de la République ('The Six Books of the Republic'). A student of Roman law and a member of the French Parlement, Bodin was concerned with the fountain of legal authority. For this pre-eminent political philosopher, that very fountain needed to be absolute, supreme, indivisible and perpetual. In other words, that fountain was to be a sovereign, which possessed sovereignty over a given territory and people. Thus sovereignty is Bodin's term for unified, unfettered legal authority. But here we must acknowledge that, whilst political power may be divided up among institutions, legal authority rests exclusively in the sovereign. Thomas Hobbes, in his 1651 book Leviathan (whose cover constitutes this entry's image), gave a good example of sovereign authority, as opposed to political power. As can be seen from the image, the body of the Leviathan - the sovereign 'Mortal God' or King of a state - is composed of many little figures. These figures represent the cogs in the machine of government, the political systems comprising the political entity as a whole. Each system has certain powers, such as trade or taxation. But they all derive their legitimate political power from the Leviathan, or sovereign monarch. Thus power may be divided in a state but authority is unified in an indivisible sovereign.Bodin and Hobbes agreed, therefore, that sovereignty was a tangible, vital part of a political entity's constitution, and that this sovereignty rested entirely in the legitimate sovereign, who, more often than not, was a monarch. But in 1762, Jean-Jaques Rousseau challenged this idea with his Du contrat social ('The social contract'). Having agreed that sovereignty was indivisible, philosophers were about to take a U-turn on where this indivisible sovereignty presided. In other words, Rousseau asked the question: who is sovereign?The resounding response of Enlightenment philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine and Rousseau himself was: the people. Instead of the monarch being sovereign, philosophers in the 18th century asked whether sovereignty could be vested in the demos (people) themselves. Hence, after two millennia of dogmatic slumber, the concept of democracy was reborn in response to the question of sovereignty. Authority, philosophers agreed, had to rest somewhere, but the rightful question was: where? Democracy was the answer to this conundrum of sovereignty, as people looked back to the heyday of Athenian democracy, from c. 508 - 322 BC. Perhaps, after a whistle-stop tour of sovereignty, we can now define the elusive term once and for all. But, before we get over-excited, it is worth acknowledging that our definition is not restrictive. Instead, there are a myriad of definitions for sovereignty, each used for different contexts. To international relations theorists, sovereignty refers to equal rights under international law. To monarchists, sovereignty refers to the days when Kings and Queens had real influence over domestic affairs. To others, it's a more imaginative way of saying, 'Brexit means Brexit'. So let's restrict ourselves to pure political science, as the study of politics within a state, and try to define sovereignty as it has been presented by philosophers over the ages. Sovereignty is, in short, the fountain of supreme legal authority from which all legitimate political power flows within a state - whether that fountain be monarchical, aristocratic or democratic in nature. But here's some food for thought: clearly most democracies have a democratic sovereign. In the USA, that democratic sovereign is the people. Yet in the UK there is a monarchical sovereign - Elizabeth II - who possesses 'supreme legal authority'. But this authority is never exercised by Elizabeth II, such that some have claimed that the people or Parliament, and not the monarch, is the real sovereign of the UK. A.V. Dicey asserted in Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1889) that 'The sovereignty of Parliament is, from a legal point of view, the dominant characteristic of our political institutions.' So in the UK, which once controlled one third of all land on Earth, who is sovereign: the Queen, Parliament or the people? I'll let you decide...